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CHAPTER 5
Reforming Taxes and Customs
Abstract This chapter describes how Georgia’s government ended the
rule of the shadow economy with the help of tax and customs reforms.
The key was simplicity. The number of general taxes was cut from 21 to 6,
all of them low, ﬂat, and simple, and despite this action tax collections
increased tenfold in the period of nine years (2003–2011) in nominal
terms and from 7 to 24 percent in terms of percent to GDP. The number
of customs duties was reduced from 16 to 3. More than 90 percent of all
imported goods were allowed into the country without any customs duty,
making Georgia one of the most open economies in the region. The
author also outlines some innovative approaches to tax administration
such as outsourcing of tax audits to private sector, using lottery for
improved tax compliance, etc. The chapter concludes with a discussion
of the Estonian model of proﬁt taxation.
Keywords Roadshow  E-ﬁling  Mediation  Ombudsman  Prime
Minister
In 2004, Georgia’s government set out to end the rule of the shadow
economy that had brought the country to the brink of bankruptcy.
Speciﬁcally, the government vowed to create a transparent system of
rules that would spur on both domestic entrepreneurship and foreign
investment. The key was simplicity. The number of general taxes was cut
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from 21 to 7. The number of customs duties was reduced from 16 to 3.
More than 90 percent of all imported goods were allowed into the country
without any customs duty, making Georgia one of the most open econo-
mies in the region. New technology was introduced to improve tax and
customs administrations; examples include compulsory e-ﬁling of tax
returns and proprietary software to spot irregularities and trigger tax
audits. To ease the bureaucratic burden for small businesses, simpliﬁed
tax keys were introduced, e.g., based on the number of chairs at a barber-
shop or the number of tables at a restaurant.
5.1 TAX CODE SIMPLIFICATION
Reducing both the number of taxes and the tax rate led to a signiﬁcant
boost in tax revenues; see Chap. 3, Rightsizing Fiscal and Monetary
Policies. These policies were the most visible elements of our tax reform,
but they constituted only a small part of a much larger package of legal and
administrative improvements. Our mission was to introduce any change
that would help reduce corruption. Cleaning up the tax department itself –
laying off people, recruiting new specialists – was an important step, but it
was not enough. Like most developing countries, Georgia suffered from a
lack of high-caliber tax professionals, and most of the really good ones
were employed by the private sector, where wages were much higher than
in the tax department. As a result, the talent pool for tax auditors was
frightfully small. We were afraid that auditors would jump at any chance to
take advantage of ambiguity and bend the rules in favor of those who were
willing to pay for it. To prevent this from happening, we made the rules as
simple and transparent as possible, leaving no room for interpretation.
This made the system largely immune to abuse, and it enabled even a small
team of auditors to enforce it. It worked. In a survey conducted by
Transparency International (“Global Corruption Barometer”) in 2012, 0
percent of respondents said that they had paid a bribe to the tax depart-
ment (Fig. 5.1).1
In 2004, Georgia introduced its new tax code, decreasing the number of
taxes from 21 to 7 (and to 6 a year later). All taxes were ﬂat and low. There
was no incentive to make one’s income appear lower than it really was to get
into a lower tax bracket. The income tax rate was 25 percent for everybody.
In 2009, it was decreased to 20 percent. The proﬁt tax rate was 15 percent,
the dividend tax rate 5 percent, the VAT rate was 18 percent, and the
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The social tax was abolished as part of the one budget principle that gives the
government freedom to use tax revenue as needed, i.e., without earmarking,
regardless of its source. In 2011, the government introduced a special tax for
SMEs, merging all duties into one to reduce the administrative burden.
SMEs could not afford accountants, which is why even the simpliﬁed new
tax codewas still too difﬁcult for them. Tomake their lives as easy as possible,
the merged revenue tax was calculated based on variables that reﬂected the
respective type of business. Examples include:
• Number of beds for small bed and breakfast establishments
• Number of chairs for barber shops
• Number of tables for small restaurants
For small traders and retailers, the merged revenue tax was calculated as a
percentage of total revenue. The simpliﬁcations helped make tax compli-
ance the new normal. For the ﬁrst time in Georgia’s recent history, every-
body contributed.
5.2 MEDIATION
One of the biggest sources of debate and disagreement among the members
of the government was the treatment of the private sector by the public
prosecutor’s ofﬁce. During the ﬁrst wave of our reforms (2004–2007), it
had been important to take a strong stance on tax issues and make sure that
everybody paid fully, especially given the reduced number of taxes and the
reduced tax rates. However, the prosecutor’s ofﬁce upheld its pressure on
businesses past this period. While this practice did not add much value in
terms of tax revenue, it increasingly prompted the hostility of business
owners toward the government, sometimes rightfully so. I was part of a
group within the government that did its best to reduce the pressure on
businesses and ensure they were given fair treatment by the authorities. To
this end, we introduced the Internal Dispute Resolution Mechanism
(IDRM), a two-round mediation approach. The ﬁrst round of mediation
was conducted by the revenue service itself. If the ﬁrst round did not bring
resolution, the dispute went to the Ministry of Finance. The IDRM panel
consisted of the top tax specialists at the Ministry of Finance and of selected
members of parliament.
While the IDRM wasn’t perfect, it was still the fastest and fairest tool to
resolve disputes between the tax department and the private sector. It also
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helped improve the performance of tax auditors. This was because the
auditors had to defend their rulings in front of the highly qualiﬁed, very
well-paid tax specialists that represented private companies in disputes.
Additionally, the IDRM helped us put the ﬁnger on ﬂaws in the tax code.
In disputes between private sector lawyers and tax department auditors, it
often turned out that both parties were right – from a legal perspective.
The issue was rooted in the regulation itself – it was unclear or ambiguous,
and could be interpreted in two or more ways. In some cases, changes to
the tax code were introduced as a result of such ﬁndings. For the most
part, the ruling of the IDRM was designated as a precedent-setting public
ruling, i.e., it was to be applied in all similar cases in the future.
Another institution that was created to protect the private sector from
potential abuse was the ofﬁce of the business ombudsman. The ombuds-
man was tasked with acting as a mediator between the private sector and
the government – not only regarding tax disputes, but other issues as well,
such as licensing, permits, privatization, and registration of businesses.
The job of the ombudsman was to identify any such contentious issues
the private sector – mostly SMEs – might have with speciﬁc government
agencies, give timely information to the Prime Minister’s Ofﬁce, create an
efﬁcient channel of communication, and play the role of a mediator before
things got out of hand.
5.3 IT-ENABLED RISK ASSESSMENT AND OUTSOURCING
OF AUDITS
Mediation revealed many problems and inefﬁciencies in the tax depart-
ment. The biggest problem was the lack of human resources. Although
salaries were not low, good tax auditors were hard to ﬁnd. And although
some of the country’s best tax specialists worked for the Ministry of
Finance, their capacity was insufﬁcient to monitor and enforce tax com-
pliance as broadly as it was deemed necessary. In response, we introduced
an IT-based risk assessment to spot tax violations and decided to out-
source some of the functions of the tax department.
The risk assessment tool was a software we had developed in-house. It
compared ﬁnancial data ﬁled by companies of similar size operating in the
same industry, identiﬁed outliers, and detected implausible entries. This
scan was based on parameters such as revenue, proﬁt margin, average
salaries of employees, changes in revenue and proﬁt, and other indicators.
If any of these ﬁgures was at odds with those of other enterprises in the same
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industry, the system would detect the anomaly immediately. In effect, we
had put in place a pattern recognition solution fueled by big data before
either term became popular. We made it a rule of thumb to conduct 80–90
percent of all tax audits based on the IT system. Only 10–20 percent of
audits were triggered by the head of the tax department. The objective was
to conduct all audits based on the tool and thereby eventually eliminate any
opportunity for the tax department, or the ﬁnancial police, to abuse their
power.
The IT-based risk assessment was aided by the introduction of
compulsory e-ﬁling,2 a measure that, in and of itself, played a major
role in decreasing Georgia’s shadow economy. Initially, e-ﬁling was
introduced for large companies only. The objective was to minimize
interaction between taxpayers and the tax department to leave less room
for manipulation and corrupt deals. But when e-ﬁling was launched for
all companies, only 5 percent chose to use it. Apparently, taxpayers
didn’t believe that electronic ﬁling was sufﬁcient. What is more, accoun-
tants were reluctant to give up their position of power as intermediaries
between taxpayers and the tax department. Although the government
ran a dedicated communication campaign, the e-ﬁling system was not
gaining sufﬁcient traction. Eventually, the government had to disallow
any paper-based tax returns. Ever since, all tax returns in Georgia have
been ﬁled electronically.
To increase the tax department’s coverage of the economy and
make the lives of taxpayers easier, the government decided to out-
source some functions of the tax department in 2011 – a highly
innovative measure at the time. The Ministry of Finance identiﬁed
ten private tax-auditing companies and gave them a special license to
conduct audits of private companies on behalf of the tax department.3
If a private company was up for an audit, the company in question
would propose one of the ten licensed private auditors to the Ministry
of Finance; any auditing ﬁrm that had recently provided services to the
auditee would not be admitted. The ministry would check if there was
any danger of a conﬂict of interest. If it found that there wasn’t, the
ministry would authorize the private auditor to represent the revenue
service and audit the company on behalf of the tax department. All
licensed private auditors were subject to random double checks. If any
irregularities were found, the license would be annulled. Once a private
enterprise had been notiﬁed in writing that an audit by the tax depart-
ment itself was imminent, this enterprise could no longer choose to be
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audited by a licensed private auditor. This was to encourage companies
to apply for private audits before they had even been earmarked for
checks by the government. When a private auditor had completed an
audit, the auditee could challenge the rulings through IDRM overseen
by the Ministry of Finance. In these cases, the private sector’s best tax
specialists would take up the issue with their peers – one group acting
on behalf of the audited company, the other on behalf of the licensed
private tax auditor. The ﬁnal decision was up to the Ministry of
Finance. It was a win-win-win approach:
• Private sector companies gladly paid to be audited by licensed private
auditors, rather than by public auditors. This was because the tax depart-
ment’s auditors were often perceived as bossy and interfered with busi-
ness operations during an audit, while private auditors were typically
more sympathetic to the needs of auditees to run their businesses.
• Licensed private auditors were happy to have found a new source of
income, and they had little reason to put this substantial revenue
stream in jeopardy by accepting bribes from auditees in exchange for
favorable audits.
• TheMinistry of Finance achieved its goal of covering amuch bigger part
of the economy, and increase tax compliance, despite its limited
resources. As a side beneﬁt, the quality of IDRM debates greatly
increased because high-caliber experts were now involved on both sides.
5.4 ADDITIONAL MEASURES
Other measures introduced or envisioned by the government to ﬁght
corruption, increase tax compliance, and create a more business-friendly
environment included mystery shopping, lotteries on receipts and credit
card payments, and electronic tracking and tracing of selected goods, such
as cigarettes and alcoholic beverages.
5.4.1 Mystery Shopping
To make sure that all shops and commercial entities conducted their
business on the record, used registers, and gave out receipts, the tax
department employed mystery shoppers.4 But since there were only a few
of these mystery shoppers, it didn’t take long until they were all known to,
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and recognized by, owners of local shops and restaurants. The authorities
decided to recruit private mystery shoppers who were trained by the tax
department to act on its behalf. These private mystery shoppers did not
receive a base salary, but were paid based only on the penalties that they
imposed on commercial entities found to be in violation of the tax code. The
approach was quite successful for a while, and it helped to reduce the size of
the shadow economy. After a fewmonths, however, privatemystery shoppers
became too aggressive and started taking advantage even of honest business
owners. The mystery shopping approach had served its purpose, and the
government decided to discontinue it before it could get out of hand.
5.4.2 Lottery on Receipts
Shopkeepers and other small commercial entities are always tempted to
keep at least a part of their business off the record, i.e., to hide some of
their income from the tax department. An easy way to help them resist this
temptation is to have shoppers ask for receipts. But how do you get
shoppers to do that? By giving them a reward, or at least the prospect of
a reward. To take advantage of this disciplinary effect, we introduced a
lottery on receipts for cash transactions. Every week, dozens of winners of
cash prizes would be drawn, and the results would be widely publicized.
The effect was signiﬁcant. Reported revenue went up every month. After
nine months, the increase started to level off, but reported revenue
remained high. Originally, the plan was to introduce a similar kind of
lottery for credit card payments to cover an even bigger part of the
economy and stimulate wider usage of credit cards, which would have
helped decrease the size of the cash-based shadow economy. This second
stage, however, was never implemented, although preliminary research
showed that it would probably have been successful.
5.4.3 Electronic Tracking and Tracing
Excised goods, such as cigarettes and alcohol, are naturally elusive.
They have a tendency to disappear off the radar of the authorities and
change hands as part of the tax-free shadow economy. To counter this
tendency and increase legitimate tax revenue, Georgia introduced an
Electronic Tracking and Tracing Mechanism (ETTM) for such goods.
In cooperation with a foreign private investor, we set up a system that
would cover the entire supply chain from manufacturing to retail.
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By the time a given product was made, it had already been assigned a
code that was transmitted to the tax department. When the product
was put in a box, that box was also marked electronically. The same
was true for the van that was used for transportation and its destina-
tion, i.e., the particular commercial entity to which the product was
delivered for sale. All codes and markings were electronically trans-
mitted to the tax department. Now all a tax inspector had to do was to
go to any of the shops and check which products actually belonged
there and which ones did not, using an electronic read-out device. The
inspector would proceed to investigate the origin, and intended desti-
nation, of any product that was found in a store where it didn’t belong
to pinpoint the perpetrator. To avoid any corrupt deals between
inspectors and shopkeepers, the devices inspectors carried were
equipped with GPS. That way, the head of tax inspection knew
which shop was visited by which employee. The next day, the same
store would be visited by a different inspector to double-check the
results of the previous day. If any of the shops that had already been
inspected was found to stock unregistered goods, the initial inspector
was subject to an investigation on charges of corruption and let go if
found guilty.
There are many solutions available to track and trace goods in this
manner. What set the particular technology we used apart from other
solutions was that it assigned and applied electronic markings before a
given product was even ﬁnished. This made it impossible for the producer
to divert part of the production to the black market. This was a key feature.
Often, the shipping of goods from factories or warehouses to retailers is
the weakest link in the supply chain as far as transparency is concerned.
Once the goods enter the retail network, it is very difﬁcult to single out
illegitimate batches. When some manufacturers found out about our plans
to introduce ETTM, they started to increase their reported revenues by 10
percent almost every month before the system was even in place, assuming
that it was better to play by the rules and stop hiding revenue before it was
too late and harsh penalties were applied.
5.5 BAZARS
In a lot of developing countries, a substantial part of small commerce is
conducted in bazars.5 Bazars are open-air market places where thousands
of traders convene and set up tables or stalls to sell everything from food
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and home appliances to furniture and car parts. Georgia is no exception.
The problem is that these transactions are conducted without any
registration of traders or taxation of sales. This is why bazars account
for a substantial share of the shadow economy. As part of its effort to
clean up the economy, the Georgian government attempted to regulate
bazars, and collect taxes from traders, as early as 2006. It was a well-
intentioned move, but it came too early. Thousands of traders gathered
to protest in front of the government building, saying that they
shouldn’t pay taxes when many other, much wealthier people did not.
In many other such cases, the government proceeded with its reforms
anyway. But in this case, the protesters were right. A substantial part of
Georgia’s economy, including many big players, had not come clean at
the time, while the protesters were low-income merchants serving poor
people. The bazars were the only places where they could conduct their
modest business. The reform was suspended – a major blow to tax
reform at the time.
In 2011, the government launched a second attempt to regulate
bazars. A special, simpliﬁed tax was introduced for small traders.
They did not have to pay VAT, calculate their proﬁt, or pay an income
tax. All they had to do was pay 4 percent on their total revenue. In
conjunction with this move, the government reached out to those who
owned the land on which the bazars were held. Since they collected
rent from all traders, they were the people who knew the traders’
revenues best. Land owners agreed to act as tax agents and collect
taxes on behalf of the government. To make the collection process
easier and more transparent, the government tried to take cash out of
the equation. The proposed concept was modeled on supermarkets.
The plan was to give new, big plots of land to landowners, obliging
them to develop these plots and build clean, comfortable facilities. A
central storage unit was to be constructed, and the plot would have to
be accessed through a gated entry and exit point. Customers would
not pay merchants in cash, but receive tickets for each transaction and
pay for all purchased goods at the exit. That way, it would be much
easier to create transparency about each trader’s revenues. At the end
of each day, traders would present their slips to the central cashier and
receive cash for their sales, less the rent and the ﬂat 4 percent tax.
Unfortunately, the concept was never fully implemented. Nevertheless,
it is a promising approach that could help other countries ﬁght the
shadow economy.
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5.6 THE ESTONIAN MODEL
In Estonia, undistributed proﬁt is not taxed. In other words, the tax on
proﬁts is only collected when proﬁt is paid out to the owner, or owners, of
a business as a dividend. If the proﬁt is re-invested in the business, it is not
taxed at all. This approach has come to be known as the Estonian model.6
It has two major advantages:
1. Investment incentive. Because re-invested proﬁt is not taxed, the
model creates additional economic activity, development, and
employment.
2. Simpliﬁcation. Calculating proﬁt tax is the number one source of
disputes between private enterprises and the tax department. Since
only dividends are taxed, proﬁt does not have to be calculated in the
ﬁrst place. All regulation for tax purposes governing deferment of
losses, depreciation, amortization, and transfer pricing between
related companies within the country can be abolished. The result-
ing tax code is very simple and leaves little room for interpretation
and corruption.
However, the Estonian model also has two minor drawbacks:
1. Need for new regulation. New rules have to be introduced to clarify
which expenses qualify as investments. This is to prevent business
owners from evading taxation by using corporate funds for personal
expenses, such as cars, houses, or vacations, and labeling these
expenses as investments, a maneuver that lets them extract money
without paying the dividend tax. While rules to prevent this kind of
fraud are much simpler than those governing the calculation of
proﬁts, it still requires an extra legislative effort initially.
2. Dip in tax revenue. When introduced, the Estonian model causes a
temporary decrease in tax revenue. This is because business owners
are usually excited about any new opportunity to save taxes and stop
paying out dividends. But this effect quickly wears off. Sooner or
later, business owners want to enjoy their proﬁts, resume dividend
payments, and start paying taxes again.
In Estonia, the dip in tax revenue leveled off after two years and was fully
compensated for by an increase in later years. The Georgian government
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considered introducing the Estonian model but found that proceeds from
the tax on proﬁts represented too high a share of total tax revenue (more
than 12 percent) at the time, and that there were no ﬁnancial resources to
compensate for the losses during the ﬁrst few years. At the time of writing,
Georgia is making a new effort to introduce the Estonian model, accord-
ing to press reports: “The government [ . . . ] is keen to introduce the
Estonian tax model, by which private companies will be exempt from
proﬁt tax if they re-invest their proﬁt back into their businesses.”7 The
introduction was approved by the parliament on May 13, 2016, and it will
take effect in January 2017.8 This development should deﬁnitely trigger
higher economic activity in 2017.
5.7 CUSTOMS REFORM
Much like the tax code, customs regulations were also radically simpliﬁed to
minimize ambiguity and prevent corruption. But unlike the police depart-
ment (see chapter on “FightingCorruption”), the customs department was
not reformed overnight. Rather, changes were introduced step by step.
Arguing that customs ofﬁcers need speciﬁc knowledge, the administration
initially let many old ofﬁcers keep their jobs and work alongside the new
recruits. In reality, the “old guard” realized that the new hires were there to
replace them. In an act of self-preservation, they got their new colleagues
implicated in their corrupt schemes. This made cleaning up the customs
department one of themost difﬁcult, andmost time-consuming, part of the
ﬁght against corruption in Georgia. The reform wasn’t complete until
2011, when most of the old employees had ﬁnally been let go and new
special customs zones (see later in the chapter) had been created.
The overarching objective of the customs reform was twofold: simplify
procedures for the private sector and decrease corruption by ramping up
monitoring mechanisms. Key elements of the simpliﬁcation included:
• The number of customs duties was reduced from 16 to 3 (with rates
of 0, 5, and 12 percent). Over 80 percent of all imported goods were
cleared at a rate of 0 percent. This made Georgia one of the most
open economies in the region. The new customs code is the least
protectionist, and most simple, such system in the world.
• All customs services were made part of a one-stop clearance process.
Previously, anyone crossing the Georgian border had to go through
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many different check points and get stamps and seals of approval
from representatives of as many as half a dozen different government
agencies: phytosanitary services overseen by the Ministry of
Agriculture (animal and plant disease control), the Department of
Cultural Heritage overseen by the Ministry of Culture, the border
police overseen by the Ministry of the Interior, the customs depart-
ment overseen by the revenue service, and so on. The change was as
radical as it was simple. In future, all agencies – except for the border
police – would be represented by the customs department. If there
were any questions regarding the regulation governing particular
products, the customs ofﬁcer was to contact the relevant government
agency and clear the goods on its behalf.
• A “golden list” containing the most customs-compliant importers
and exporters was compiled. Companies that had a track record of
clean books, honest customs declarations, and reliable payments
were allowed to take imported goods directly to their warehouses
through a special (so called “green”) customs corridor. Additionally,
they were allowed to pay customs duties with a 30-day delay. These
privileges motivated other companies to follow suit, and become
more compliant, to be included in the list.
• To support the hub economy concept (see Chap. 4, Creating a
Business-Friendly Climate), special customs regulations were intro-
duced, allowing goods to be stored in designated customs-free
zones. Customs clearance was due only once the stored goods were
sold, an approach that resembles the free port concept that was in
effect in Hamburg, Germany, for more than a century. In Georgia,
special customs zones were, and still are, widely used by car traders.
They import cars to Georgia’s special customs zones and only pay
customs clearance duties when the cars are sold, often to buyers from
other countries in the region. Before long, the designated special
customs zones became the places where imported cars are mainly
traded. As a result, Georgia has become the biggest car-trading hub
in the region, leading to the creation of about 20,000 new jobs.
Additionally, the customs code itself was clariﬁed to eliminate ambiguity;
see Chap. 2, Fighting Corruption, for details. These and other simpliﬁca-
tions made the clearance process much more business-friendly and greatly
improved customs compliance. However, the simpliﬁcations were not
5 REFORMING TAXES AND CUSTOMS 109
sufﬁcient to eradicate corruption at Georgia’s borders completely. This is
why additional monitoring measures were introduced:
• Hardware. The government invested in technology to facilitate checks
and improve surveillance in customs areas. Scanners and cameras were
hot-linked to the surveillance center at the Ministry of Finance. This
was to prevent customs ofﬁcers from manipulating the data feed.
Cameras covered all areas of the customs clearance process, from the
border crossing itself to the areas in which vehicles and cargo were
inspected. The live feed was transmitted directly to the surveillance
center, and anymisconduct was punishedwithout pardon or exception.
• Software. The ASYCUDA9 software system, developed by the
United Nations and widely used by customs authorities worldwide,
was introduced in Georgia. It is based on four tiers of scrutiny
that correspond to color-coded customs gates: green, blue, yellow,
and red. Green stands for free passage without any check, while red
stands for a detailed check on the spot. Every importer has to pass
one of these gates. The color is assigned by an automated risk
assessment system. This module is the most important part of the
new system; the risk assessment module automatically assigns a given
batch of goods to one of the four color-coded gates. Customs
ofﬁcers are not allowed to interfere with the assignment, which is
made based on historical data about a given company, a given type of
product, and a given country of origin. The automation prevents
customs ofﬁcials from abusing their position of power and granting
preferential treatment to importers in exchange for bribes. Ad hoc
checks of vehicles or cargo are only permissible under exceptional
circumstances and require approval by a supervisor.
The reforms described previously improved the performance of the
customs department substantially. The biggest leap came in 2011, when
the special customs zones were built. All the previously described policies
were in effect in these zones, and the customs department introduced
some additional innovations to make the clearance process even more
transparent and business friendly:
• All vehicles that crossed the border and carried goods for import
were directed to the closest special customs zone.
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• If the clearance process was not completed within 30 minutes, a
supervisor would get involved. If the delay was the fault of a customs
ofﬁcer, that ofﬁcer would be let go. If the delay was due to ambig-
uous regulations, these regulations would promptly be clariﬁed.
• Brokers were eliminated and all procedures, including the comple-
tion of customs forms, were taken over by representatives of the
revenue service.
Getting rid of brokers turned out to be the biggest challenge. It is a
service that exists in many countries. The broker helps importers deal
with the customs department and ﬁll out special customs clearance forms.
Filling out these forms was, in fact, a big hurdle for importers in Georgia.
They were very complicated and required knowledge of special product
codes with which most ordinary business people were unfamiliar. Most
brokers were former customs ofﬁcials with close relations to active mem-
bers of the customs department. Because of these ties, brokers were able
not only to help importers with their forms, but also to charge special
fees for preferential treatment. Although it was hard to prove, the general
assumption was that brokers passed on a part of the fees they charged to
active customs ofﬁcials. In any case, eliminating these intermediaries
made the customs clearance process much more transparent. Employees
of the revenue service took the place of brokers and helped importers ﬁll
out the required forms. According to independent research, customer
satisfaction increased immensely, and Transparency International con-
ﬁrmed that customs-related corruption was reduced. Here is a verbatim
statement by an importer: “Three years ago, to import anything, you had
to visit ten rooms and pay someone extra money in each room for getting
all your papers in order. It created a whole chain of corruption and delay
that involved everybody. Today it’s much easier. It’s very organized there
now. There’s one room now, and we know in advance how much we’ll
have to pay.”10
NOTES
1. http://www.transparency.org/research/gcb/overview (retrieved in May
2016).
2. E-ﬁling is deﬁned as “the process of using a computer program to transmit
information electronically to another party.” (http://www.businessdiction
ary.com/deﬁnition/e-ﬁle.html#ixzz49eyuFP7x; retrieved in May 2016).
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3. Out of the ten, four were the “Big Four” – international players and six were
local companies.
4. In the private sector, a mystery shopper is a person “hired by a market
research ﬁrm or a manufacturer to visit retail stores, posing as a casual
shopper to collect information about the stores’ display, prices, and quality
of their sales staff.” (http://www.businessdictionary.com/deﬁnition/mys
tery-shopper.html#ixzz49f3rhd00; retrieved in May 2016).
5. Bazar, sometimes also translated as bazaar, is the Persian word for market.
6. http://www.amcham.ge/diary/rtable_2016-03-09/estonian-model.pdf
(retrieved in May 2016).
7. http://mondediplo.com/blogs/georgia-neoliberalism-and-industrial-pol
icy (retrieved in May 2016).
8. http://www.messenger.com.ge/issues/3629_may_17_2016/3629_econ_
one.html (retrieved in May 2016).
9. ASYCUDA stands for Automated System for Customs Data (https://www.
asycuda.org/; retrieved in May 2016).
10. Stephen F. Jones, The Making of Modern Georgia, Routledge, London/
New York 2014 (p. 108); http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacn591.pdf
(retrieved in May 2016) (Jones 2014).
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